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Abstract. Adversarial examples are artificially modified input samples
which lead to misclassifications, while not being detectable by humans.
These adversarial examples are a challenge for many tasks such as im-
age and text classification, especially as research shows that many ad-
versarial examples are transferable between different classifiers. In this
work, we evaluate the performance of a popular defensive strategy for
adversarial examples called defensive distillation, which can be successful
in hardening neural networks against adversarial examples in the image
domain. However, instead of applying defensive distillation to networks
for image classification, we examine, for the first time, its performance
on text classification tasks and also evaluate its effect on the transfer-
ability of adversarial text examples. Our results indicate that defensive
distillation only has a minimal impact on text classifying neural networks
and does neither help with increasing their robustness against adversarial
examples nor prevent the transferability of adversarial examples between
neural networks.
Keywords: adversarial examples, defensive distillation, text classifica-
tion, convolutional neural network, robustness
1 Introduction
One of the main goals in neural network research is the creation of robust models,
especially against noise in the input data. A special form of noise are so-called
adversarial examples, first discovered by Szegedy et al. [24]. This special type of
noise is explicitly crafted to make a classifier misclassify samples without being
detectable by humans (up to manipulating the sample so that it is classified to
any class the adversary desires). This impact is increased for image classification
by a property called transferability [24], which means that adversarial images
created for one network have a high chance of being also misclassified by networks
with different architectures or training sets.
Recently, adversarial examples have also been created for deep neural net-
works used for text classification [11,22,27]. Such examples are challenging for a
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lot of cases, such as automatic indexing and text filtering. In automatic index-
ing, adversarial examples could change the index of a document, e.g. to push
an advertising article into a different category, while in text filtering adversarial
examples could change the filter outcome, e.g. change a spam e-mail so it is not
detected by the spam filter. Since deep neural networks now achieve similar or
better results compared to traditional methods for text classification (e.g. deci-
sion trees or support vector machines) [9,28,29], adversarial examples can prove
problematic for real-world text classification applications.
Consequently, one of the main research goals with respect to adversarial
examples is to develop defense mechanisms that make neural networks less sus-
ceptible to these adversarial examples. This is especially important for neural
networks that are applied in sensitive application areas. The goal is, therefore,
to harden these neural networks in order to prevent (adversarial) misclassifica-
tions. There already exist methods for hardening (deep) neural networks for im-
age classification, such as defensive distillation [18,19], Batch Adjusted Network
Gradients [21], or detecting adversarial examples like in SafetyNet[12]. However,
such work is currently missing for deep neural networks for text classification.
In this work, we examine whether it is possible to transfer one popular defense
mechanism, called defensive distillation [18,19], for adversarial image examples
to the text classification domain in order to increase the robustness of the deep
neural network against both adversarial examples and their transferability. We
use the algorithm of Samanta and Mehta [22] for generating adversarial exam-
ples in the text domain and evaluate the effectiveness of defensive distillation on
two datasets. Our experiments show no increased robustness of networks trained
with defensive distillation for both, directly generated adversarial examples and
adversarial examples generated for a network trained without defensive distilla-
tion. Additionally, our results show that defensive distillation is also not effective
in preventing the transfer of adversarial examples from one network to another.
2 Related work
Szegedy et al. [24] introduced adversarial examples for deep neural networks for
image recognition. They also added the concept of transferability of adversarial
examples between neural networks with different architectures and trained on
different datasets. The first proposed method for generating adversarial examples
of images is the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) by Goodfellow et al. [6]. To
find these samples, the sign of the cost function’s gradient (with respect to the
input) is added to the original image. Because this basic approach of using the
gradient is used by many of the current methods, the gradient has an important
role for both generating adversarial examples and hardening networks.
As a result, many hardening methods perform gradient masking [20]. While
this can help against white-box attacks (where the process generating the ad-
versarial examples has access to the model), it does not work for methods based
on probability [23] or black-box attacks. In black box attacks, the generating
process has no direct access to the model and needs to generate adversarial
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examples by other means, e.g., by creating them on a different network and
exploiting transferability. An overview of the current research on adversarial
examples focusing mostly on image classification can be found in a survey by
Akhtar and Mian [2], who summarize different popular generation methods (in-
cluding real-world examples), the current understanding of adversarial examples,
and different methods of increasing robustness of neural networks.
Since text is discrete rather than continuous (like images), methods for cre-
ating adversarial examples for images cannot directly be applied to the text
domain [27]. In addition, small changes can be detected more easily by humans
and can easily change the semantics of a sentence [27]. Liang et al. [11] were the
first to examine adversarial examples for text-processing deep neural networks.
They focused on so-called Hot Training Phrases (HTP) and Hot Sample Phrases
(HSP), which are phrases which contribute strongly to the determination of the
predicted class. Both HTP and HSP are determined using the cost gradient of
the prediction, and both are then used in conjunction for modifying the original
sample to generate an adversarial example. Through insertion, modification and
deletion as well as combining these three strategies, Liang et al. [11] are able to
generate adversarial examples.
Samanta and Mehta [22] extend Liang et al.’s algorithm using the same three
basic operations (insertion, modification, deletion). The algorithm works on a
current word wi which changes every round, ordered by the cost gradient (the
word with the highest gradient is chosen first):
1. If the current word wi is an adverb, it is deleted (because this operation
often does not change the grammar of the sentence).
2. Else, a word pi is chosen from a candidate pool P and processed as follows:
(a) If the chosen word pi is an adverb and the current word wi is an adjective,
the chosen word pi is placed before the current word wi.
(b) Else, the current word wi is replaced with the chosen word pi.
The candidate pool is built from synonyms, typos and genre specific keywords
which are words which can only be found in one class.
This was later followed up by more work as shown in a survey by Zhang
et al. [27]. Besides different ways of generating adversarial examples, they also
report two ways of increasing robustness used in the literature: data augmen-
tation (where adversarial examples are included in the training set) and adver-
sarial training (changing the learning function to include adversarial examples
as additional regularization). However, most current defense mechanisms can be
circumvented. Data augmentation sometimes helps to prevent adversarial exam-
ples generated with the same method as the augmented adversarial examples but
fails to harden the network against adversarial examples generated by methods
that were not used for the augmented dataset. Jia and Liang [8] present another
example where data augmentation does not help against modified generation
algorithms. As a result, developing effective defense mechanisms against adver-
sarial examples in the text domain remains as a challenge for many real-world
applications.
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Fig. 1: Single-layer convolutional neural network model with different kernel
sizes for text classification.
3 Methodology
3.1 Datasets
We used the following two datasets as the basis for generating adversarial ex-
amples in this paper and to evaluate the effects of defensive distillation:
AG’s corpus of news articles: The AG’s corpus of news articles is a dataset of
news article metadata (including URL, title, category, description, and publi-
cation date) [1]. The metadata of almost 500.000 articles can be found in the
XML version. Given this description, the task is to predict the category of the
article. Similarly to Zhang et al. [28] we only consider the four largest categories:
World, Entertainment, Sports, and Business. Because of the size of the dataset,
only the first 4000 articles of each category are used for the training set (total:
16000) and the following 400 (total: 1600) for the test set.
Amazon movie reviews: The Amazon movie reviews dataset [13], taken from the
Stanford Network Analysis Project [10], contains Amazon movie reviews from
the years 1997-2002. The task is to rate the review as good (≥ 4.0) or bad (≤ 2.0)
based on the text of the review. Because of the size of the dataset, 2000 reviews
for each category were taken into consideration (total: 4000), with an additional
200 (total: 400) from each category for the test set.
3.2 Text encoding
In order to process the text with a neural network, we need an appropriate repre-
sentation of it. We chose to encode our words with word2vec [14], which encodes
each word into a single vector containing continuous values. The resulting vec-
tors are concatenated and used as input for our network. In this paper, we used
the model trained by Mikolov et al. [15] on the Google news corpus to encode
each word into a 300-dimensional vector.
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AP - Pau Gasol and Spain won the Olympics’ first matchup of NBA stars Sunday,
easily beating Yao Ming and China. Gasol, who plays for the Memphis Grizzlies,
had 21 points and 10 rebounds despite missing 6 minutes in the first quarter
because of a Yukos bloody nose, and Spain won 83-58.
(a) The network’s classification changes from Sports (correct) to World (incorrect)
through the insertion of the word “Yukos” (highlighted in blue).
Denzel Washington will next direct The Great Debaters, a film based on a true
story about an all-black high school debate eventing (team) in 1935, MTV reports
(b) The network’s classification changes from Entertainment (correct) to Sports
(incorrect) through the modification of the word “team” which is replaced by the
word “eventing” (highlighted in red).
Fig. 2: Generated adversarial examples on the AG dataset.
3.3 Neural Network Model
We use a convolutional neural network (CNN) similar to the ones proposed
by Kim [9] and Zhang and Wallace [29]. The architecture (see Fig. 1) consists
of a single convolutional layer with multiple kernels, where the kernels have
different window sizes (we use window sizes of 3, 4, and 5 in our network). The
convolutional layer is followed by a global max-pooling and a fully connected
layer with dropout. The advantage of this simple architecture is its fast training
and high flexibility due to the different kernel sizes. All networks are trained using
categorical cross-entropy as the loss function, as used by Zhang and Wallace [29].
3.4 Creating Adversarial Examples
Formally, the problem of finding an adversarial example can be defined as fol-
lowing: given a model f (e.g. a neural network) and an input x with the label
y, find some noise  so that f(x + ) = y′ with y′ 6= y. To avoid detection by
humans, the noise  should be as small as possible.
In this work, we use a version of the algorithm by Samanta and Mehta [22],
where the candidate pool P , from which possible words for insertion and re-
placement are drawn, was created from the following sources:
– Synonyms gathered from the WordNet dataset [5],
– Typos from a dataset [16] to ensure that the typos inserted are not recognized
as artificial since they occur in normal texts written by humans, and
– Keywords specific for one input class which were found by looking at all
training sentences and extracting words only found in one class.
Words from the candidate pool were only considered if the part of speech (e.g.
plural noun) matches the target word. Examples of adversarial samples created
in this paper can be seen in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
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Still haven’t got it. I ordered this series a month ago, I received in the mail a
completely trivia (different) movie addressed to someone in connecticut ( I live
in Louisiana) I then payed out of my own pocket to mail it to the address on
the slip. I contacted the seller and they said they would work on getting me my
product. Then yesterday I sent an email to see what was going on and they told
me they have confirmation of delivery a month ago. So now I have to reexplain
what happened to what I am assuming is a different employee.
(a) The network’s classification changes from bad (correct) to good (incorrect)
through the deletion of the word “completely” (crossed out) and the modification of
the word “different” which is replaced by the word “trivia” (highlighted in red).
Don’t buy The quality is horrible. The screen shakes through the whole movie.
The title screen excels (is) all in spanish even though the movie is in english. You
would be better off recording it off the television.
(b) The network’s classification changes from bad (correct) to good (incorrect)
through the modification of the word “is” which is replaced by the word “excels”
(highlighted in red).
Still enjoy watching. Watching older movies, such as this one, can be quite enjoy-
able. There is no reliance on special effects, just what is needed to get to points.
Otherwise this is a people movie commenting on Welles’ vision of what may be.
Rod Taylor plays his part well and for once was not the cavalier playboy as in
others. A nice piece was the featurette that included an ONLY updated visit of
Welles and his friend. Nothing fancy, good watching.
(c) The network’s classification changes from good (correct) to bad (incorrect)
through the through the insertion of the word “ONLY ” (highlighted in blue).
Fig. 3: Generated adversarial examples on the Amazon movie dataset.
3.5 Defensive Distillation
Defensive distillation is a method proposed by Papernot et al. [18,19] and is
based on the distillation method by Hinton et al. [7]. Both methods are based
on the idea that knowledge from one neural network can be transferred to an-
other neural network by using soft labels (the output of a previously trained
network which represents the probability of the different classes) for the training
instead of hard labels (where every data belongs to exactly one class). To achieve
this effectively, the soft labels have to be calculated according to the following
equation:
yi =
eli/T∑
i e
li/T
,
where yi is the probability of the i-th class, li the i-th logit (the inputs to the
final softmax level) and T the temperature. The temperature is used to control
how “soft” the resulting labels are. A high T (T →∞) means that a sample has
a uniform probability of belonging to any class and a small T (T → 0+) means
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that the label becomes more similar to a one-hot vector. A special case is T = 1,
which equals the normal softmax.
These soft labels can now be used to transfer knowledge from the original
network to a distilled one. The original network is trained as usual and the soft
labels are then calculated for the training set using a high temperature (e.g.
Papernot et al. [18] suggest a temperature of T = 20). These soft labels are then
used to train the distilled network, which has to use the same temperature in its
last layer during training. After that, the temperature is set back to T = 1 and
the distilled network can be used normally.
The difference between distillation and defensive distillation is that Hinton
et al. [7] use distillation to transfer knowledge from a large neural network to a
small one while retaining accuracy, whereas Papernot et al. [18,19] use defensive
distillation to transfer knowledge from one network to another one with the
same size with the goal of making it harder to find adversarial examples for the
distilled network. In this work, we use the variant described by Papernot et al.
[18] and the network is trained on both the hard and the soft labels since this
can significantly improve the process according to Hinton et al. [7].
4 Experiment setup
To examine whether defensive distillation [18,19] has any effects on adversarial
examples for text classification, we trained neural networks with and without
defensive distillation. After that, adversarial examples were generated for each
of the networks1. Since the goal is to determine whether defensive distillation
actually increases the robustness against adversarial examples, it is not necessary
to find the optimal hyperparameters for each dataset. Therefore, the temperature
T = 20 chosen for all experiments is the one used by Papernot et al. [18] for the
MNIST dataset. To get a better overview over the influence of the temperature,
the temperatures T = 10, T = 30 and T = 40 were also tested. For the training,
both the soft labels and the hard labels were used, where the loss function
consists of 10% of the hard label loss and 90% of the soft label loss. All networks
were trained for 10 epochs since no notable improvement of accuracy occurred
after that.
The question remains whether transferability is an inherent property of ad-
versarial examples or if transferability can be prevented. Some recent research
[26] suggests that it might be possible to prevent transferability, however, at the
time of writing more research is needed in this direction. To test whether de-
fensive distillation has any effect on transferability, we use adversarial examples
created on the network trained without distillation and investigate whether these
are also misclassified by the neural network trained with defensive distillation.
An adversarial example is tested on the distilled network if the distilled network
predicts the class of the corresponding unaltered input correctly. As a baseline,
the same examples are tested on retrained networks without distillation.
1 The software used for the experiments can be found online at https://github.com/
Top-Ranger/text_adversarial_attack
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Table 1: Accuracies of defensively distilled networks trained with different
Temperatures T against test set of the specified dataset.
Dataset T = 10 T = 20 T = 30 T = 40
w/o
distillation
AG 0.733 0.728 0.739 0.744 0.759
Amazon movie 0.798 0.825 0.795 0.780 0.885
5 Results
The accuracies of the networks trained with and without defensive distillation
are reported in Tab. 1. The performance of the networks trained with distillation
is slightly worse compared to the networks trained without distillation, which
is expected according to Papernot et al. [18]. The accuracy achieved in the
experiment is comparable to others for the Amazon movie dataset (0.82-0.95 by
Zhang et al. [28]) and slightly lower for the AG dataset (0.83-0.92 by Zhang et
al. [28]).
When we look at the success rate of generating adversarial examples (see
Tab. 2), the difference between the distilled and the non-distilled networks is
marginal at best. Overall, the success rate of generating adversarial examples
is high with 96% to 98% percent, with no visible difference between the dif-
ferent temperatures. This is surprising, since the experiments of Papernot et
al. [18] showed improved robustness for image processing networks even for low
temperatures.
When looking at the number of changes (Tab. 3), we can see that distilla-
tion makes it slightly more difficult to generate adversarial examples. The mean
number of changes went up for all experiments (AG: 3.52 to 3.94−4.47, Amazon
movie: 14.76 to 17.31− 19.29). A similar increase can be seen in some instances
for the median number of changes (Amazon movie: 3 to 4), however, these seem
to be minor. The difference between the mean and the median can be explained
if we look at the distribution in Fig. 4: while most generated adversarial exam-
ples only need a few changes, a small number of adversarial examples need a
large number of changes increasing the mean value.
Table 2: Success rates of generating adversarial examples for networks trained
with defensive distillation with different Temperatures T .
Dataset T = 10 T = 20 T = 30 T = 40
w/o
distillation
AG 0.976 0.981 0.972 0.978 0.982
Amazon movie 0.961 0.966 0.974 0.966 0.984
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Table 3: Number of changes for generating adversarial examples with defensive
distillation and Temperature T. Numbers in brackets are without distillation as
comparison.
T Dataset
Mean length
of sentences in
successful runs
Mean
number
of changes
Median
number
of changes
Mode
number
of changes
10
AG 32.12 (32.76) 4.47 (3.52) 2 (2) 1 (1)
Amazon movie 148.85 (139.80) 19.29 (14.76) 4 (3) 1 (1)
20
AG 32.01 (32.76) 4.18 (3.52) 2 (2) 1 (1)
Amazon movie 143.05 (139.80) 18.39 (14.76) 4 (3) 1 (1)
30
AG 32.00 (32.76) 4.13 (3.52) 2 (2) 1 (1)
Amazon movie 140.04 (139.80) 18.47 (14.76) 4 (3) 1 (1)
40
AG 31.76 (32.76) 3.94 (3.52) 2 (2) 1 (1)
Amazon movie 141.24 (139.80) 17.31 (14.76) 4 (3) 1 (1)
Another aspect is robustness against transferability. Tab. 4 shows that the
transferability rate for the AG (0.323 − 0.337 compared to 0.369) and Amazon
movie (0.199 − 0.253 compared to 0.250) datasets is a bit lower in most cases
compared to the retrained network without distillation, with a difference of only
0.032 − 0.051. Based on this, we conclude that defensive distillation has only a
small impact on transferability and does not, in fact, prevent it.
6 Discussion
Our results indicate that, at least on the two tested datasets, defensive distil-
lation does not have the same effect for text classification as it has for image
classification. The robustness against adversarial examples of networks trained
with defensive distillation increases only slightly. One reason for this might be
that defensive distillation effectively performs gradient masking [25,20], which
works against methods which directly or indirectly add the gradient to the in-
put. However, in the algorithm used in our experiments the value of the gradient
is only used to measure the importance of a given word on the network’s final
output, not directly added onto the input. The exact characteristics of the gra-
dient are not important and, as a result, the gradient masking itself has only a
minimal effect on our algorithm.
This hypothesis is further boosted by the results of Carlini and Wagner [4],
who were able to generate adversarial examples for networks trained with defen-
sive distillation with a slight modification to the generating algorithm on image
classification tasks. They did this by restoring the gradient from the gradient
masking done by defensive distillation. This shows that the gradient still holds
10 M. Soll, T. Hinz, S. Magg, S. Wermter
100
101
102
103
 5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50
Nu
m
be
r o
f E
xa
m
pl
es AG Dataset T=10T=20
T=30
T=40
100
101
102
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Nu
m
be
r o
f E
xa
m
pl
es
Number of Changes
Amazon Movie Dataset T=10T=20
T=30
T=40
Fig. 4: Distribution of changes for generated adversarial examples for networks
trained with defensive distillation; note the logarithmic scale on the y-axis.
enough information for the generation of adversarial examples for image clas-
sification tasks, but it might not be as easily accessible as without defensive
distillation. If this hypothesis is true, this might mean that other methods based
on gradient masking are also not effective in the text domain.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that, at least on the two tested datasets, defensive
distillation does not work for hardening neural networks for text classification
against adversarial examples. This still leaves two questions open: is gradient
masking an option for increasing the robustness of neural networks and, if not,
how can the robustness of neural networks for text classification be increased?
To answer the first question, the effect of gradient masking [25,20] for both image
classification and text classification should be studied in more detail, especially
since similar results for another method of increasing robustness for image clas-
sification (saturated networks [17]) were achieved by Brendel and Bethge [3]. For
this, different methods of gradient masking should be analyzed in future exper-
iments to see if the gradient could be restored in a similar fashion. To answer
the second question, different methods of hardening neural networks for text
classification need to be examined. The question still remains open whether dif-
ferent methods from image classification can be successfully transferred to text
classification or whether completely new approaches must be developed.
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Table 4: Transferability of generated adversarial examples to networks trained
with defensive distillation with Temperature T.
T Dataset
Number
tested
Success
rate
Success rate
w/o distillation
10
AG 8150 0.323 0.369
Amazon movie 1157 0.218 0.250
20
AG 8126 0.331 0.369
Amazon movie 1217 0.199 0.250
30
AG 8141 0.325 0.369
Amazon movie 1229 0.253 0.250
40
AG 8134 0.337 0.369
Amazon movie 1195 0.211 0.250
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